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Abstract
Despite the popularity of direct democracy in recent decades, research on the actual output effects of popular decision-
making is rare. This is especially true with regard to equality, where there are at least three major research gaps: 1) a lack
of cross-national analyses; 2) insufficient investigation of the differential effects of different direct democratic instruments
on equality; and 3) a failure to distinguish between different aspects of equality, i.e., socioeconomic, legal and political
equality. This article takes a first step to tackle these shortcomings by looking at all national referenda in European democ-
racies between 1990 and 2015, differentiating between mandatory, bottom-up and top-down referenda. We find that a
large majority of successful direct democratic bills—regardless of which instrument is employed—are not related to equal-
ity issues. Of the remaining ones, there are generally more successful pro-equality bills than contra-equality ones, but the
differences are rather marginal. Mandatory referenda tend to produce pro-equality outputs, but no clear patterns emerge
for bottom-up and top-down referenda. Our results offer interesting, preliminary insights to the current debate on direct
democracy, pointing to the conclusion that popular decision-making via any type of direct democratic instrument is nei-
ther curse nor blessing with regard to equality. Instead, it is necessary to look at other factors such as context conditions
or possible indirect effects in order to get a clearer picture of the impacts of direct democracy on equality.
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1. Introduction
In light of declining conventional political participation
and growing dissatisfaction with representative democ-
racy all over the Western world, calls for an expansion
of direct democratic options have become quite pop-
ular in recent times. Initiatives and referenda are per-
ceived as a possible cure for the current “crisis of democ-
racy” by increasing the involvement of citizens in politi-
cal decision-making and thereby fostering their support
for the political system in general (Bowler, Denemark,
Donovan, & McDonnell, 2017; Dalton, 2004). This has al-
ready led to an increasing use of direct democratic op-
tions worldwide during the last 30 years. Likewise, par-
ties not only from the left (cf. Michels, 2009), but across
the ideological spectrum are campaigning to further en-
large those options.
However, the effects of direct democracy on society
are far from being uncontroversial among political scien-
tists. An important topic in this regard is the question of
how direct democracy impacts equality within modern
societies. Up to now, findings on this topic are mixed:
some scholars acknowledge the potential of direct demo-
cratic instruments to foster equality (Feld, Fischer, &
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Kirchgässner, 2010; Frey & Goette, 1998; Garry, 2013),
while others warn that they further increase the gap be-
tween already influential and non-influential citizens be-
cause they advantage the former in pursuing their in-
terests (Merkel, 2011; Merkel & Ritzi, 2017; Schäfer &
Schoen, 2013).
Possible explanations for these divergent findings
could be that outputs differ depending on the direct
democratic instrument, the concept of equality em-
ployed or the country investigated. The existing studies
in this field find somewhat contradictory results with re-
gard to different instruments and equality dimensions:
while it has been reported that welfare expenditure
tends to be lower in countries with mandatory refer-
enda and to be higher in countries with national initia-
tives (hinting at possibly differing impacts regarding so-
cioeconomic equality), legal and political rights ofminori-
ties seem to be better protected under mandatory ref-
erenda than under optional ones and initiatives (Blume,
Müller, & Voigt, 2009; Blume & Voigt, 2012; Vatter &
Danaci, 2010).
Against this background, further investigation of the
effects of different direct democratic instruments on
equality, covering a wide range of countries as well as
various dimensions of equality, is needed. This article,
which is part of the DFG-funded project “Inequality and
direct democracy”, aims at taking a first step in this di-
rection by looking at whether there are, at the national
level, more successful pro- or contra-equality bills that
passed via different direct democratic instruments dur-
ing the last decades in European democracies. By doing
so, we want to gain an overview of how many pro- and
contra-equality outputs are produced by the different in-
struments. Clearly, the results of this article cannot give a
definite answer to the question of how direct democracy
influences equality, but they can give a first, preliminary
overview of which sort of bills are successful in differ-
ent direct democratic instruments and how they relate
to equality.
For the purpose of our study we proceed as follows:
we first outline our theoretical considerations regarding
equality and its dimensions, direct democracy in its dif-
fering forms, and the connection between the two. We
proceed by providing an overview of the current litera-
ture on direct democracy and equality, pointing out ex-
isting research gaps. Afterwards, we present our case se-
lection and coding approach to address the issue. In our
result section, we compare the numbers of all successful
pro- and contra-equality bills that were put to a direct
democratic vote at a national level in European democ-
racies from 1990 to 2015. We draw on a dataset of all
popular votes that took place in this time period and dis-
tinguish between mandatory, bottom-up and top-down
referenda. We acknowledge that this research approach
comes with certain limitations: first, we do not look—in
detail—at the social and political context inwhich the ref-
erenda took place. Second, our research design does not
allow for any inferences about a possible indirect effect
of direct democracywith regard to equality. Third, our re-
search design implies a causal impact of different direct
democratic instruments on equality but does not allow
for an infinite answer with regard to causality. In general,
this article should be understood as a first attempt to get
an idea of howmany successful pro- and contra-equality
bills pass via different direct democratic instruments in
Europe—and if any interesting patterns emerge in this
context. Our results reveal that a large majority of suc-
cessful bills are not related to equality issues at all and
therefore cannot be expected to have an impact in this
regard. For any direct democratic instrument, there are
relatively small differences with regard to the numbers
of successful pro- and contra-equality bills. Still, the pat-
tern emerges that there are slightly more successful pro-
equality bills than contra ones and that especiallymanda-
tory referenda tend to produce pro-equality outputs. In
the conclusion, we discuss how our results can serve as
a basis for future research on the topic and give proposi-
tions for doing so.
2. Theoretical Background
Before investigating the outputs of different direct demo-
cratic instruments for equality, we need to address at
least three issues from a theoretical perspective. First,
we have to conceptualize our understanding of equality
and its various dimensions. Second,we have to give a def-
inition of direct democracy and its different instruments.
Third, we have to explain why direct democracy possibly
has an impact on equality and why different instruments
might differ in their impact. The following paragraphswill
address these issues.
First, regarding the conceptualization of equality, in
the broadest sense this means a relationship between
two or more reference objects (e.g., A and B) with re-
gard to a certain benchmark X (Alexy, 1986; Altwicker,
2011; Westen, 2016). The debate in the social sciences
about how to conceptualize equality in a more narrow
way revolves mainly around the concepts of “equality in
result” and “equal opportunity” (Devins&Douglas, 1998;
Siegel, 1998; Strauss, 1992). We stick to the first under-
standing of equality as closing the gap between disadvan-
taged (A) and well-off groups (B) with regard to a certain
benchmark (X). We do this because in highly unequal so-
cieties, i.e., societies with large gaps between disadvan-
taged and well-off groups, equality of opportunity also
tends to decrease. Or, in other words, closing the gap
between different social groups within society will also
enable and increase equal opportunities (see also Rawls,
1971, p. 278).
Sometimes it is necessary to treat groups unequally
in order to foster equality in result—to give benefits to
those who are worse off at the expense of those who are
better off (Altwicker, 2011; Sartori, 1992). Therefore, all
direct democratic bills that aim at making society more
equal (by proposing equal or unequal treatment of cer-
tain social groups) are considered as pro-equality.
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As mentioned in the introduction, equality occurs
in different dimensions. Regarding the effects of direct
democracy, most of the literature focusses on aspects of
socioeconomic equality. Another point of scientific inter-
est are the implications of direct democratic options and
decisions forminorities, containing issues of legal and po-
litical equality (see Section 3). We want to gain knowl-
edge about direct democratic outputs for equality that
is as encompassing as possible. Therefore, we include
three dimensions of equality and define them in the fol-
lowing way:
1. Socioeconomic equality: equality regarding the so-
cioeconomic status (SES; aspects such as income,
education, health, or property);
2. Legal equality: equality regarding the legal status
of the inhabitants of a country;
3. Political equality: equality regarding the scope of
political influence (especially of minority groups).
Second, direct democracy is defined as popular votes on
issues—excluding direct elections or recalls of politicians.
Similar to Blumeet al. (2009) andBlumeandVoigt (2012),
we differentiate between three different types of direct
democratic instruments: bottom-up referenda (initiated
by citizens, i.e., referenda against parliamentary deci-
sions or new initiatives); top-down referenda (initiated
by parliament or government); and mandatory refer-
enda (specific laws—e.g., changes to the constitution—
that must be approved by a popular vote according to
the constitution).
Third, as mentioned above, in the literature the ques-
tions of why and how direct democracymay be expected
to have an effect on equality are generally approached
from the socioeconomic perspective orwith regard tomi-
norities. One prominent argument, mainly linked to so-
cioeconomic equality, is that low SES groups tend to lose
in direct democratic decisions because disproportionally
few poor people vote compared to well-off upper and
middle classes. As a result, the decisions would mirror
the socioeconomic interests of the better-off and there-
fore disadvantage low SES groups. This theoretical ex-
pectation of direct democracy decreasing socioeconomic
equality is for example promoted by Wolfgang Merkel
(Merkel, 2011; Merkel & Ritzi, 2017).
This negative impact of direct democracy on so-
cioeconomic equality might also be expected from the
perspective of the median voter theorem (Black, 1948;
Downs, 1957). Applied to direct democracy, it is assumed
that outputs of direct democratic votes should generally
mirror the preferences of the median voter. Increasing
government spending on welfare, benefitting low SES
groups, is probably not in line with the socioeconomic
interests of a median voter, at least in relatively well-off
countries with a large middle class.
Regarding the legal and political dimensions of equal-
ity, some scholars are more optimistic, once again argu-
ing with the median voter perspective: in their view, the
output of direct democracy forminorities should depend
on the attitudes of the majority of the voters regard-
ing the respective minority. Therefore, direct democracy
is expected to lead to minority-friendlier policies if vot-
ers support these policies more than political decision-
makers do, and expected to disadvantage minorities if
voters opposeminority-friendly ruling (Matsusaka, 2004;
Töller & Vollmer, 2013; Vatter & Danaci, 2010). So, as
attitudes towards certain minority groups may vary be-
tween different regions or countries, so may the outputs
of direct democratic decisions in light of legal and politi-
cal equality.
As discussed above, not only different dimensions
of equality, also different direct democratic instruments
should be taken into account. Eder and Magin (2008) im-
ply that bottom-up referenda should be more protective
ofminority rights than the output of top-down ones. This
is mainly because in the former case minorities can initi-
ate votes as well as veto bills that would disadvantage
them. While the study by Eder and Magin (2008) mainly
deals with the legal and political equality of minorities,
the same reasoning might also apply to socioeconomic
equality—but in the opposite direction: bottom-up refer-
enda might for the most part be initiated by well-off citi-
zens with the financial resources to stem successful cam-
paigns, presumably proposing policies in their interest in-
stead of an extension of welfare programs. In contrast,
bills in top-down and mandatory referenda are drafted
by politicianswhowant to be re-elected, so at least some
of them might address low SES groups.
Summing up, there are some ideas out there on
why and how—different—direct democratic instruments
might have an impact on equality, but the matter is far
from clear. Moreover, one has to keep in mind that the
theoretical approaches we have just briefly introduced
build on the idea of a causal impact of direct democracy
on equality. However, the other causal pathway must
also be kept in mind, i.e., that certain levels of inequality
within a society lead to a different use of direct democ-
racy and also to different outputs in direct democratic
votes. The aim of this article is not to test any causal re-
lationship or make strong inferences about mechanisms
on how exactly direct democracy might impact equality
in European countries. Instead, we follow a rather de-
scriptive approach by looking at successful direct demo-
cratic votes and their impact on equality in order to see
if interesting patterns emerge that can then serve as the
basis for further, more in-depth, analysis. Before present-
ing our results, we give a brief overview of the empirical
literature on direct democracy and equality, with a spe-
cial focus on the few articles that actually differentiated
between direct democratic instruments.
3. State of the Art
As options for and the use of direct democracy are in-
creasing, several scholars have addressed its effects on
equality in recent years. As mentioned earlier, they ei-
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ther concentrate on aspects of socioeconomic equality
or investigate political and/or legal equality of minorities.
Most of the research has concentrated on the US and
Switzerland andmany scholars analyzed the effect of the
existence of direct democratic options instead of the out-
puts of concrete bills. Moreover, only few studies differ-
entiated between direct democratic instruments.
The following section will briefly summarize the find-
ings of previous studies that dealt with the impact of di-
rect democracy on equality. We will first present those
findings that are mainly concerned with socioeconomic
equality and, in a second step, present those that deal
with legal and political equality. In the two parts we will
consider both studies that look at direct democracy in
general and studies that explicitly differentiate between
different direct democratic instruments.
For the first part—namely regarding the impact of
direct democracy on socioeconomic equality—it can be
said that the negative assumption by Wolfgang Merkel
(2011, 2015) is backed up by a number of empirical re-
sults: educative spending is lower in US states with di-
rect democratic options and resourceful groups benefit-
ted at the expense of worse-off in some German direct
democratic votes (Berry, 2014; Schäfer & Schoen, 2013;
Töller & Vollmer, 2013). Also, several studies found that
Swiss cantons or US states with more direct democratic
options invest less in social spending (Berry, 2009; Feld
& Kirchgässner, 2000; Freitag & Vatter, 2006; Matsusaka,
2004; Moser & Obinger, 2007; Wagschal & Obinger,
2000). While this is usually assumed to result in less so-
cioeconomic equality, Feld et al. (2010) actually observe
no effect of differences in welfare spending on levels
of income equality in Swiss cantons with more or less
direct democratic options. Moreover, findings by Fatke
(2014, p. 112) suggest that “there is no evidence that SES
affects participation in direct democracies significantly
more or less than in representative systems”, which gen-
erally speaks against Merkel’s (2011) rather pessimistic
argumentation regarding direct democracy.
The only studies in this regard that differentiate be-
tween direct democratic instruments find contrasting
patterns: while countries with national initiatives tend
to spend more on welfare, expenditures are lower in
countries with mandatory referenda (Blume et al., 2009;
Blume & Voigt, 2012). Also, the use of mandatory fiscal
referenda decreases redistribution through personal in-
come taxes in Swiss cantons in the short run, while the
use of initiatives increases it in the long run (Morger
& Schaltegger, 2018). This might tempt one to assume
a negative effect of mandatory referenda on socioeco-
nomic equality, and a positive one of bottom-up refer-
enda. However, it is important to note that the authors
of the cross-national analysis investigate the legal exis-
tence of direct democratic options and not their actual
use and outputs.
When it comes to the impact of direct democracy
on legal and political equality, results are even more
mixed. While Gamble (1997), Haider-Markel, Querze,
and Lindaman (2007), and Lewis (2013) emphasize
the negative implications of direct democracy in US-
American states for (at least some) minority groups, Frey
and Goette (1998) find minority rights to be protected
by referenda in Switzerland. Regarding political equality,
Flavin (2013, p. 130) indicates that a frequent use of initia-
tives in American states “may be a viable avenue for en-
suring that the opinions of disadvantaged citizens are rep-
resented in the political arena”. The majority of studies
on both countries arrives at somewhat nuanced conclu-
sions: context conditions seem to determine whethermi-
norities are discriminated against in the US, and charac-
teristics of the respective minority groups might be deci-
sive for whether their rights are endangered or protected
through direct democracy in Switzerland (Bollinger, 2007;
Christmann & Danaci, 2012; Donovan & Bowler, 1998;
Hajnal, Gerber, & Louch, 2002; Helbling & Kriesi, 2004;
Vatter, 2000; Vatter & Danaci, 2010).
Regarding different effects depending on the direct
democratic instrument employed, empirical studies are
again scarce, but do point in one direction: Gamble
(1997) states that the discrimination against minorities
in the US mainly happened via bottom-up referenda
preventing parliament from protecting these groups—
Vatter and Danaci (2010) find bottom-up referenda sig-
nificantly decreasing the probability of minority protec-
tion in Switzerland compared to mandatory referenda.
Overall, empirical results do not offer definite an-
swers to the question of how direct democracy can be
expected to impact equality. Regarding the socioeco-
nomic dimension, the tendency is towards a negative
effect, while context factors seem to make the differ-
ence. This is also especially true in case of legal and polit-
ical equality. The few existing studies suggest positive ef-
fects of bottom-up referenda on socioeconomic equality,
but negative ones on legal and political equality, while it
might be the other way around for mandatory referenda.
Different instruments of direct democracy should cer-
tainly get more attention in terms of their possibly dif-
ferent effects on equality. This can be seen as one re-
search gap in the current literature. Additionally, most
studies in the field focus on the US or Switzerland and
just one dimension of equality. The few existing com-
parative analyses mostly look at legal options of direct
democracy without regarding actual direct democratic
outputs—a fact that, as Berry (2014) shows, is at least
somewhat problematic for the causal interpretation of
results. Our article aims to take a first step in addressing
these research gaps by looking at all national-level direct
democratic bills in Europe from1990 to 2015, and assess-
ing their outputs for socioeconomic, legal and political
equality, thereby differentiating between direct demo-
cratic instruments. With our results we provide a de-
scriptive overview of how direct democratic outputs in
Europe have addressed issues of equality. In the follow-
ing, we will present our case selection, coding rules, and
methodological challenges inmore detail before present-
ing our results.
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4. Coding and Data
This article is part of the DFG-funded project “Inequal-
ity and Direct Democracy in Europe”, which analyzes all
direct democratic bills at subnational and national level
in European democracies from 1990 to 2015 regarding
their output for equality. In this article, we focus solely
on successful bills at the national level.
For each successful bill, we assessed if the bill pro-
posed measures that fostered or hampered socioeco-
nomic, political or legal equality. Every bill that proposes
measures that would help to close the gap between dis-
advantaged and better-off groups (by giving the great-
est benefit to the worse-off or restricting benefits to the
better-off) is considered as pro-equality. Vice versa, bills
that would increase this gap (by giving further benefits
to the better-off or restricting those to theworse-off) are
considered as contra-equality.
This assessment of (potential) equality outputs of a
bill is perhaps most straightforward regarding socioeco-
nomic equality. We count as disadvantaged those social
groups that are worse off than the general majority with
regard to socioeconomic aspects such as income, educa-
tion, housing or welfare. For legal equality, a bill has to
propose measures that improve the legal situation of so-
cial groups that do not enjoy the same rights as other
groups. Examples are the legalization of same-sex mar-
riages or easier naturalization for long-term residents
without citizenship. In order to count as pro-equality in
political terms, bills have to propose measures that im-
prove the situation of political minorities and thereby
enable them to increase their political influence relative
to powerful political mainstream actors. Political minori-
ties are understood as groups whose political aims signif-
icantly differ from mainstream political actors (e.g., ma-
jor parties)—with regard to the social or ethnical groups
they primarily represent (e.g., Black Lives Matter Move-
ment) or issues that they put on their agenda (e.g.,
Pirate Party).
For the coding, we have to keep in mind that the
dimensions of socioeconomic, legal and political equal-
ity might sometimes overlap and cannot necessarily be
seen as independent of each other. A rise of socioe-
conomic equality within a country is likely to also lead
to more political or legal equality, and vice versa. How-
ever, for the coding process this was not a major prob-
lem as most successful pro- (or contra-) equality bills
clearly aimed at one specific dimension of equality. For
example, therewere bills on extendingwelfare programs
(socioeconomic equality), legalizing same-sex marriage
(legal equality) or increasing proportional representation
in parliament (political equality). In very few cases more
than one dimension came into play, and with these we
coded for that dimension on which the bill was mostly
concerned with. As a result, bills were not coded pro- or
contra-equality on multiple dimensions.
As mentioned earlier, we analyze all national-level
direct democratic votes between 1990 and 2015 in
European democracies. We count as democratic all Eu-
ropean countries that were considered free according to
the Freedom House index in the year of the vote. To col-
lect data on the votes and instruments employed, we
drewonwell-established online search engines for direct
democracy such as www.sudd.ch or www.c2d.ch. Be-
tween 1990 and 2015, 515 direct democratic bills were
voted upon in European democracies, of which 240 took
place in Switzerland. 321 referendawere bottom-up, 116
mandatory and 78 top-down. Figure 1 shows the distribu-
tion of all votes for each year.
Figure 1 reveals that the frequency of votes varied
substantially over the years, with aminimumof 8 in 2007
and a maximum of 31 in 2003. There has been no pe-
riod of time when direct democracy was especially popu-
lar or rarely used at all—the peaks and troughs fluctuate
quite regularly. Table 5 (see Appendix) presents a short
overview of the countries included in our sample and
gives information about which direct democratic instru-
ments are available at the national level. While in some
countries such as Norway or the Netherlands we find
very few or no referenda at all, other countries such as
Italy, Liechtenstein and—obviously—Switzerland make
use of referenda quite frequently so that we find a lot
of cases for these countries.
Out of our 515 bills, we had to exclude some fromour
sample. First, we excluded those without sufficient infor-
mation on the content of the bill to evaluate its output
for equality. Second, bills that proposed changes regard-
ing direct democratic procedureswere excluded, as keep-
ing them would have required a judgment on the effects
of direct democracy on equality—which is exactly what
we are looking at. Third, we excluded bills that proposed
highly complex measures, for example comprehensive
tax systems overhauls. These would have required in-
depth case studies and therefore were out of the scope
of this article. Fourth, bills on joining international orga-
nizations such as the EU or NATO were excluded. Mem-
bership in, for example, the EU has so many implications
for so many aspects of equality that it is not possible to
code it in a straightforward way.
Summing up, we only included those direct demo-
cratic bills in our sample for which we were able to
make clear and sound judgments on their (possible) out-
puts for socioeconomic, legal or political equality. Table 1
gives you a few examples of bills that were excluded due
to one of the reasons mentioned.
After the exclusion of those cases, we were left with
373 direct democratic bills in our sample. From this
sample, we then only looked at those that were suc-
cessful, meaning those that had an actual political out-
put. We assessed, whether the measures that those bills
proposed would foster or hinder equality on our three
dimensions—or if they were not related to equality at all.
Multiple sources were used for these assessments, such
as the bill proposal itself, NGO reports, newspaper arti-
cles, political science articles and legal texts. A codebook
with several key questions can be found in the Appendix
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Figure 1. Direct democratic votes in European democracies 1990–2015 (national level).
Table 1. Examples of cases excluded from sample.
Example Reason for Exclusion
Referendum in Lithuania: 8/27/1994 Missing data: not enough information on the actual content of
Referendum on indexing the value of the bill accessible
long-term capital investments
Referendum in San Marino: 7/3/2005 Bill on direct democratic instruments
Bill on introducing a 40% approval quorum
for direct democratic votes
Referendum in Liechtenstein: 10/21/1990 Complex issue: comprehensive reform with multiple complex aspects to it,
Bill on comprehensive tax reform no clear assessment of the effects regarding equality possible without
in-depth case study
of this article. To make the coding more reliable, it was
undertaken by multiple researchers. For the whole sam-
ple, we arrived at a congruency of 93.2% and excluded
only 6 cases which were coded differently by every coder.
Table 2 shows some examples of pro- and contra-equality
bills for each dimension:
Table 2. Core examples of pro- and contra-equality bills.
Socioeconomic Equality Political Equality Legal Equality
Pro Equality Hungary: 03/09/2008 Liechtenstein: 08/11/1992 Ireland: 05/22/2015
Referendum on abolition of Referendum on abolition of Referendum on legalizing
fees for higher public the 8% threshold for same-sex marriage
education parliamentary elections
Non-Equality- Switzerland: 04/01/1990 Liechtenstein: 03/10/2002 Lithuania: 06/14/1992
Related Initiative against highway Referendum on raising funds Referendum on the withdrawal
between Biel and for the Little Big One music of Soviet troops from
Solothurn/Zuchwil festival Lithuania by end of 1992
Contra Switzerland: 09/27/1998 Poland: 09/06/2015 Slovakia: 02/07/2015
Equality Referendum on reduction Introduction of majoritarian voting Referendum on banning
of pensions for orphans system for parliamentary elections adoption by same-sex
and widows instead of proportional voting system couples
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We assessed the output of each bill, based on their
title, the wording of the proposal or the data sources at
hand, mentioned above. Additionally, some literature ex-
ists on most cases, helping us to make sound judgments
regarding their connection to our equality dimensions.
One example is a referendum in Italy that took place in
1995, which aimed at restricting the number of private
television channels owned by one person to one. While
this at first glance does not seem to be related to equality,
literature tells us that it was intended to limit the politi-
cal influence of Silvio Berlusconi, thereby increasing po-
litical equality (Capretti, 2001; Tagliabue, 1995). It might
be possible that bills we coded as not related to equality
had effects on equality in their actual outcome (not out-
put). To assess this, we would have had to do case stud-
ies of all of the 373 bills, which was beyond the scope of
this article.
5. Results
In order to get an impression of the way in which the
outputs of national-level direct democratic votes differ
depending on the instrument used, Table 3 shows how
many successful bills have pro-/contra-equality outputs
and how many are not related to equality at all. It en-
tails the three equality dimensions and total numbers,
each differentiated between bottom-up, mandatory and
top-down referenda. Cramér’s V indicates whether there
is a significant relationship between the instrument em-
ployed and the shares of pro- and contra-equality out-
puts and those bills that did not relate to equality. In to-
tal, 129 out of the 373 bills in our sample were adopted
in a direct democratic vote—60 via bottom-up, 52 via
mandatory, and 17 via top-down referenda.
When looking at Table 3, it first of all becomes clear
that most of the adopted bills are not related to our
equality dimensions at all. This is true for over 65% of all
successful bills that are included in our analysis. There-
fore, numbers for pro- and contra-equality outputs are
relatively small and allow only for limited conclusions
about differences between instruments and dimensions.
Nevertheless, there is a significant, moderate rela-
tionship between the direct democratic instrument and
the distribution of pro-, contra- and non-equality-related
outputs for every equality dimension and in total. The
levels of significance are at 10% and 1% for political
equality. This indicates that direct democratic instru-
ments might indeed make a difference when it comes
to the adoption of pro- and contra-equality bills, leav-
ing all other things aside. In total, mandatory referenda
produce (slightly) more outputs fostering equality than
hindering it. For bottom-up and top-down referenda, the
numbers are more balanced.
Turning to the single dimensions, first, we see a
narrow but positive record for socioeconomic equality
across all instruments except top-down referenda, of
which none has an output related to equality. This is also
the only dimension where bottom-up referenda result in
more pro-equality outputs than in contra-equality ones.
Second, only very few direct democratic outputs concern
political equality and the numbers of pro- and contra-
outputs are, more or less, balanced with only minor dif-
ferences for bottom-up referenda. Finally, bottom-up ref-
erenda more often widen the gap between legally disad-
vantaged groups and the rest of society, thus decreasing
legal equality. The opposite is true for mandatory and
top-down referenda: their outputs more often increase
than decrease legal equality. But here again, the num-
bers are very small and therefore differences should not
be overestimated.
As Switzerland is a special case, both because of its
long history of direct democracy and its widespread use,
we repeated our tabulations without the Swiss cases.
The respective results can be found in the Appendix
(Table 6). Without the Swiss cases, the relationships be-
tween instruments and outputs lose their significance.
This comes as no surprise as almost half of the bills are
from Switzerland, and underlines the preliminary charac-
ter of our findings and the need for further research on
the topic. Still, there are some other differences in the
results worth mentioning. The record of bottom-up ref-
erenda especially improves when excluding Switzerland:
taking all equality dimensions together, they now result
slightlymore often in pro-equality outputs than in contra-
equality ones. While they still have a negative ratio re-
garding legal equality, it is not as distinct as it is when in-
cluding the Swiss cases. When it comes to political equal-
ity, numbers for bottom-up referenda are now balanced.
Patterns for mandatory and top-down referenda remain
more or less the same, with the number of mandatory
votes dropping considerably without the Swiss ones. The
differences regarding bottom-up instruments, although
only small in numbers, underline the importance of con-
text when judging the output of direct democratic instru-
ments: further research should investigate if the nega-
tive record for bottom-up votes for political and legal
equality in Switzerland holds over a longer time period
and, if yes, why this is the case, when in other countries
outputs of these votes are more balanced.
Clearly, the results presented above might appear
somewhat confusing at first glance. For this reason we
have summarized them in Table 4.
In Table 4 you find an overview on the proportions
of successful pro- and contra-equality bills for each di-
rect democratic instrument and each equality dimension,
including and excluding the Swiss cases. + stands for
more pro-equality outputs, − for more contra-equality
ones, and 0 for a balanced number of pro- and contra-
equality outputs.
Summing up, our findingsmake clear that a greatma-
jority of successful—national-level—direct democratic
bills in Europe are not related to equality issues at all.
Those differences that we find regarding different direct
democratic instruments, different equality dimensions
and the number of successful pro- and contra-equality
bills are generally rather small. Generally, there are
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Table 3. Pro- and contra-equality outputs.
Socioeconomic Equality Political Equality Legal Equality Total
Bottom-up Mandatory Top-down Bottom-up Mandatory Top-down Bottom-up Mandatory Top-down Bottom-up Mandatory Top-down
Pro 9 7 0 1 0 2 1 4 2 11 11 4
Equality (15%) (13.46%) (0%) (1.67%) (0,00%) (11.76%) (1.67%) (7.69%) (11.76%) (18.33%) (21.15%) (23.53%)
(+1)
Non- 47 45 17 56 52 13 51 47 15 34 40 11
Equality- (78.33%) (86.54%) (100%) (93.33%) (100%) (76.47%) (85%) (90.38%) (88.24%) (56.67%) (76.92%) (64.71%)
Related (0)
Contra 4 0 0 3 0 2 8 1 0 15 1 2
Equality (6.67%) (0.00%) (0%) (5%) (0%) (11.76%) (13.33%) (1.92%) (0%) (25%) (1.92%) (11.76%)
(–1)
Number 60 52 17 60 52 17 60 52 17 60 52 17
of Votes (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
(Total)
Cramér’s V 0.1746* 0.2290*** 0.1966** 0.2215**
Notes: * = 10% significance (Chi2); ** = 5% significance (Chi2); *** = 1% significance (Chi2).
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Table 4. Overview of the proportions of pro- and contra equality outputs/bills.
Bottom-Up Mandatory Top-Down
Incl. Excl. Incl. Excl. Incl. Excl.
Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland
Socioeconomic Equality + (+) + (+) 0 0
Political Equality − 0 0 0 0 0
Legal Equality − (−) + (+) + (+)
Notes: the parentheses () indicate that the relationship between direct democratic instrument and equality output is insignificant.
slightly more pro-equality outputs than contra- ones—
which is especially true for socioeconomic equality. As
Table 4 indicates, mandatory referenda produce more
pro- than contra-equality outputs, for both the socioe-
conomic and the legal equality dimension—again keep-
ing in mind that we are talking about minor differences
here. Bottom-up referenda produce slightly more pro-
equality outputs on the socioeconomic dimension but
also slightly more contra-equality ones for legal equality.
All in all, it is important to keep inmind that these results
stem from a very limited number of cases—a majority
of the national-level direct democratic outputs analyzed
in our article do not relate to equality at all, and differ-
ences between the instruments lose significance when
omitting Switzerland. Therefore, the findings presented
in Table 4 are only first impressions that can serve as a
starting point for future research on the topic.
6. Conclusions
In this article, we have dealt with the question of
whether there are, at the national level, more successful
pro- or contra-equality bills that passed via different di-
rect democratic instruments (bottom-up, top-down and
mandatory referenda) during the last decades in Euro-
pean democracies. In order to answer this, we built on
three equality-dimensions—namely socioeconomic, po-
litical, and legal equality—andwedrewon a dataset of all
national-level referenda in European democracies from
1990 to 2015.
The aim of the article was to gain a first impression of
the relationship between direct democratic instruments
and equality by presenting descriptive statistics, thereby
encouraging further analytical, in-depth research. In or-
der to give an overview that is as encompassing as pos-
sible while at the same time sticking to a reliable coding
procedure, we had to exclude those direct democratic
votes where the output in equality terms could not be
evaluated in a straightforward way. Of course it may be
that the excluded caseswould show a picture that is com-
pletely different from the onewe present now. Neverthe-
less, we are able to make statements about a majority of
the national-level bills that were voted on in our studied
period—namely 373 out of 515 bills in total, and 129 suc-
cessful ones.
Our first major finding was that most of the remain-
ing outputs were not related to any of the three equality-
dimensions at all—somewhat easing concerns about di-
rect democracy as a serious threat to equality, but at the
same time limiting its promises as a potential “road to
equality”. This left us with relatively small numbers of
pro- versus contra-equality outputs and differences be-
tween those. We therefore cannot draw generalized con-
clusions from our findings. Nevertheless, some patterns
emerged that deserve further investigation.
First, our results indicate that the outputs of bottom-
up referenda fostered socioeconomic equality slightly
more often than hindered it—a finding that fits the the-
oretical assumption that minority groups (in this case
low SES ones) can use this direct democratic instrument
to foster their interests. However, it was the other way
around for legal equality, where bottom-up votes slightly
more often hindered than fostered equality. This might
support previous findings on the negative impact of
bottom-up referenda on minority protection (Gamble,
1997; Vatter & Danaci, 2010).
Second, the bivariate test of the relationship be-
tween instruments of direct democracy and equality
hints to a relatively good record of mandatory referenda
in terms of fostering equality. This might speak against
the findings by Blume et al. (2009) and Blume and Voigt
(2012) on the option for this instrument resulting in less
welfare spending. However, three things are important
here: first of all, in our dataset only seven national-level
mandatory votes resulted in an output that was related
to socioeconomic equality at all. While all of these out-
puts were pro-equality, such a small number of cases
without controls does not allow for major inferences.
Second, if our finding would also hold in replications
covering more cases and including context factors, the
differentiation between option and use became appar-
ent: the opportunity to hold mandatory referenda does
not necessarily mean that they are also employed—at
all or with regard to welfare spending. Therefore, it is
quite difficult to come to solid conclusions about the in-
fluence of direct democracy on socioeconomic equality
by only looking at legal options. While this might cap-
ture indirect effects of direct democracy, the direct ef-
fects of actual votes are ignored. Third, confirmation of
our findingswould also point to the importance of taking
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other aspects of socioeconomic equality besides welfare
spending into account.
Generally, this article is a first attempt to look at
the outputs of successful direct democratic bills in
Europe with regard to equality. In our investigation of all
national-level referenda from 1990 to 2015, we have dis-
covered some interesting patterns but the limited char-
acter of our findings does not allow for any final conclu-
sions. Instead, future research can investigate if similar—
or different—patterns emerge when taking into account
more cases and also when looking at potential context
factors. Clearly, a number of different aspects such as cit-
izens’ attitudes towards minorities, the composition of
the electorate, interactions between direct democratic
instruments and the representative system, the general
level of equality in a country, or the existence of vot-
ing and approval quora could play an important role in
this context. Therefore, in order to arrive at a deeper un-
derstanding of the matter, it would be necessary for fu-
ture research projects to look at these factors in detail.
The results of this article give us first ideas of how differ-
ent direct instruments have had an impact on equality in
Europe and can serve as a starting point for such future
research projects.
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Appendix
Table 5. Overview of available direct democratic instruments in European democracies.
Country Bottom-Up* Top-Down** Mandatory
Andorra No Yes Yes
Austria No Yes Yes
Belgium No No No
Bulgaria Yes Yes No
Croatia Yes Yes Yes
Cyprus No No*** No
Cyprus (North) No Yes No
Czech Republic No No*** No
Denmark No Yes Yes
Estonia 	 Yes Yes
Finland No Yes No
France No Yes Yes
Germany No No Yes
Gibraltar No Yes Yes
Greece No Yes No
Hungary Yes Yes Yes
Iceland No Yes Yes
Ireland No Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes No
Latvia Yes Yes Yes
Liechtenstein Yes Yes Yes
Lithuania Yes Yes Yes
Luxembourg Yes Yes No
Malta Yes Yes Yes
Netherlands No No No
Norway No No*** No
Poland No Yes No
Portugal Yes Yes Yes
Romania No Yes Yes
Serbia Yes Yes Yes
Slovakia Yes Yes Yes
Slovenia No Yes No
Spain No Yes Yes
Sweden No Yes No
Switzerland Yes Yes Yes
United Kingdom No Yes Yes
Notes: * Includes those that are listed as citizen initiative by IDEA; ** Includes those that are listed as optional referendums by IDEA; ***
but ad hoc referendums are possible. Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (n.d.).
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 365–379 377
Codebook
Dimension Guiding Questions
(Code pro-equality if any of these questions can be answered with “yes” except 1.8)
1. Socioeconomic Equality 1.1) Does the bill propose measures that will increase income for low SES groups? (i.e.,
raising the minimum wage, give tax cuts to low income people, raising pensions etc.)
1.2) Does the bill propose measures that make (higher) education more affordable for low
SES groups?
1.3) Does the bill propose measures that make healthcare more affordable for low SES
groups? Does it lower patient contributions in the health care sector?
1.4) Does the bill propose measures that make housing more affordable for low SES groups?
(i.e., raising housing subsidies, expand public housing, etc.)
1.5) Does the bill propose measures that expand social welfare programs?
1.6) Does the bill propose measures that abolish/lower other kinds of fees that are not
proportionally rising with income?
1.7) Does the bill propose measures to invest in common goods mainly benefitting low SES
groups? (e.g., public transportation)
1.8) Does the bill propose measures that increase the retirement age? (if yes code
contra-equality)
2. Political Equality 2.1) Does the bill propose measures that strengthen the political voice/powers of (political)
minorities?
2.2) Does the bill propose measures that lead to a more proportional composition of
parliament? (i.e., get rid of/weaken majoritarian voting procedures, get rid of certain
% thresholds for parliamentary elections)
2.3) Does the bill propose measures that increase the media presence of (political)
minorities? Does it propose measures against media monopolies of certain political
actors?
3. Legal Equality 3.1) Does the bill propose measures that give more legal rights to disadvantaged groups?
(i.e., allowing same-sex marriage, allowing adoption for same-sex couples, allowing
permanent residents without citizenship to vote in elections, etc.)
3.2) Does the bill propose measures that facilitate the way to citizenship? (i.e., for
immigrants that are long-term residents of the country, for children of immigrants that
were born/raised in the country, etc.)
3.3) Does the bill propose measures that give more rights to immigrants/asylum seekers?
Does it increase protection against deportation?
3.4) Does the bill propose measures that improve the legal status of foreign residents of
a country? (i.e., allow them to buy property, allow them to work in certain professional
fields, make them eligible to apply for social welfare programs/unemployment
benefits, etc.)
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 365–379 378
Table 6. Pro- and contra-equality outputs without Switzerland.
Socioeconomic Equality Political Equality Legal Equality Total
Bottom-Up Mandatory Top-Down Bottom-Up Mandatory Top-Down Bottom-Up Mandatory Top-Down Bottom-Up Mandatory Top-Down
Pro 3 1 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 5 3 4
Equality (11.54%) (7.14%) (0%) (3.85%) (0%) (11.76%) (3.85%) (14.29%) (11.76%) (19.23%) (21.43%) (23.53%)
(+1)
Non- 23 13 17 24 14 13 22 11 15 17 10 11
Equality- (88.46%) (92.86%) (100%) (92.13%) (100%) (76.47%) (84.62%) (78.57%) (88.24%) (65.38%) (71.43%) (64.71%)
Related (0)
Contra 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 1 0 4 1 2
Equality (0%) (0%) (0%) (3.85%) (0%) (11.76%) (11.54%) (7.14%) (0%) (15.38%) (7.14%) (11.76%)
(–1)
Number of 26 14 17 26 14 17 26 14 17 26 14 17
Votes (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
(Total)
Cramér’s V 0.1918 0.2078 0.1731 0.0763
Reference
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Direct democracy database. International institute for democracy and electoral assistance. Retrieved from https://
www.idea.int/data-tools/data/direct-democracy
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